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Since the establishment of official Polish-North Korean relations in October 
1948 until late 1961, relations between both States were close and warm. During the 
Korean War, Poland (together with other countries from the Eastem Bloc) provided 
aid, received orphans, and after the signing of the armistice, engaged in the 
reconstruction of North Korea1. Moreover, it sent its representatives to the Neutral 
Nation Repatriation Commission and the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission, 
where Poles did not maintain neutrality and acted in favor of the DPRK2.
The first half of 1961 did not foreshadow the eventual deterioration of mutual 
relations. North Korea received an 11.25 million rubles loan to purchase eąuipment 
for 10 industrial objects, Poland sent a group of specialists in order to draw plans 
for the construction of several objects, and a new ship possessed by the Polish 
Ocean Lines was named “Phenian” (Pyongyang)3.
22nd Congress of the CPSU and Its Consequences
Many things had changed after the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, held in October 1961. During the event, Nikita Khrushchev repeated 
his criticism of Stalin’s crimes and the cult of individuals, expressed for the first time 
in February 1956 at the 20* Congress, in his so-called “Secret Speech”. Moreover, 
Stalin’s remains were removed from Lenin’s tomb, which symbolically showed that 
the USSR under Khrushchev was going to conduct different policy than the former 
dictator. The Soviet leader also underlined the commitment of the socialist camp to 
peaceful coexistence with capitalism, and condemned leaders of the Albanian Labor 
Party for not accepting principles formulated during the 20th Congress4.
Right after the Congress, North Korean authorities did not inform its society 
about the most controversial events which had taken place in October 1961 in
1 S. Szyc, The relations between Poland and North Korean in 1948-1961, “Progress. Jour­
nal ofYoung Researchers” 2017, vol. 2, pp. 123-130.
2
3 Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter: AMSZ), Department II, 49/64, w. 
3, Raport Polityczny Ambasady Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej w Koreańskiej Republice 
Ludowo-Demokratycznej za okres od dnia 2 6 IV 1961 roku do dnia 20 X I1961 roku, Pyongy­
ang, 20 X I1961 r.
4 L. M. Liithi, Chiny -  ZSRR. Zimna wojna w świecie komunistycznym, Warszawa 2011, 
pp. 212-213.
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Moscow. Kim II Sung forbade party members to discuss Stalinism and the Albanian 
issue. Moreover, he was afraid that the Soviets would attack his rule, the same 
way they did in regard to the Albanian EnverHoxha regime5. Taking this into 
account, it is understandable that the DPRK authorities became angry when the 
Polish Embassy in Pyongyang included in its Korean-language bulletin a resolution 
passed in December 1961 by the Polish United Workers Party. The resolution 
supported decisions madę during the 22nd Congress and shortly repeated them6. 
After publication, a representative of North Korean Foreign Ministry instructed 
Polish diplomats that controversial problems should not be mentioned in the 
embassy’s bulletins, especially because this was information that authorities did 
not want to be circulated among the society.
Afew months after the Congress, the DPRK initiated dispute over “revisionism”. 
The North Korean press started to publish ąuotations from Lenin, which according 
to the Soviets, had been carefully selected in order to point out that the USSR 
was conducting a revisionist policy. However, North Korean officials did not want 
to admit that this was a real reason of publishing those ąuotations and claimed 
that their goal was to teach busy and hard-working people about the classics of 
Marxism-Leninism7. What is morę, in late 1962, North Korean authorities ensured 
Soviet ambassador VasilyMoskovski that they avoided discussion over different 
opinions inside the communist camp because they did not want to negatively affect 
the morale of the Korean People’s Army. The Soviet envoy was told that DPRK 
officials wanted their troops to believe in a united front of communist States, ready 
to support their fight in case of war8.
After the Congress, North Korea madę several other moves that resulted in 
the gradual decline of relations with the Soviet Union and its European satellites, 
including Poland. Because Kim II Sung was afraid that the wave of De-Stalinization 
could undermine his position, he limited contacts between North Korea and 
that group of States, as well as between their citizens. The number of exchanged 
delegations significantly decreased, North Korea forced its students to leave 
“revisionist” countries, and limited the freedom of moves for foreign diplomats, 
as well as for Polish and Czechoslovak delegates working in the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission. Foreigners from States subordinated to Moscow were 
under constant surveillance while staying on Korean soil.
Poles noticed signs of this new course in the first half of 1962. In that
5 B. Szalontai, „ You Have No Political Linę o f Your Own ”. Kim II Sung and the So- 
viets, 1953-1964, [in:] Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 
2003-Spring 2004, p. 97.
6IXPlenum KC PZPR 21-22 listopada 1961 r., Warszawa 1961, pp. 162-165.
7 AMSZ, Departament II, 10/66, w. 3, Notatka z rozmów przeprowadzonych 4 kwietnia 
br. Na przyjęciu z okazji święta narodowego Węgierskiej Republiki Ludowej, Pyongyang, 7 
IV 1962 r.
8 Ibid.,, Notatka z rozmów z Ambasadorem ZSRR W. Moskowskim, Pyongyang, XI 
1962 r.
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period, only economic cooperation was developed what was mainly a conseąuence 
of the above mentioned loan given by Poland. At the same time, political and 
cultural collaboration was meaningfully limited. In May 1962, North Koreans 
informed Poles that the DPRK did not plan people-to-people exchanges in fields 
of culture and science during the whole year. That statement explained the 
behavior of DPRK officials who, in previous months, refused to answer Polish 
imutations for participation in conferences and festivals held in Poland. Under 
pressure from the Polish Embassy, they gave answers when it was too late to send 
North Korean delegates9.
Since 1962, foreigners who visited North Korea faced a nationalistic approach 
towards them. In late 1962, the Polish Embassy reported discrimination against 
European women who had married Korean citizens and lived in the DPRK. Those 
women, while in public places, encountered rude behavior like a refiisal of service 
in shops or accosting on the streets10. What is morę, DPRK authorities launched 
a campaign in an effort to destroy such relationships. According to the Polish 
Embassy, in the early 1960s, there were six mixed Polish-Korean marriages living 
in North Korea, and in the late summer of 1963, all couples were separated as a 
result of DPRK policy. In the aftermath of such ruthless treatment, one woman tried 
to commit suicide. Another one asked the Polish Embassy in Moscow for asylum for 
her husband who had fled to the USSR in order to reunite with his wife and child11.
The scalę of tragedy touching Polish citizens in that regard was ąuite smali 
when compared to the Soviet’s case. Until mid-1963, 70 Soviet women who were 
forcibly separated from their Korean husbands, left the DPRK. Furthermore, 6 
women, together with their spouses, moved from Pyongyang to the countryside, 
and another 37 lived in the North Korean Capital in complete isolation hoping for 
their husbands return12.
Another conseąuence of mistrust was the return of North Korean students 
from Poland in 1962. DPRK authorities wanted to avoid resistance and informed 
students that they would go for a short trip to North Korea, and would come back 
soon. That is why students did not take the majority of their belongings and left 
Poland without saying goodbye to their friends, partners, and professors. They were 
completely shocked when they realized that it was a one-way joumey. After coming
9 Ibid., Raport Polityczny Ambasady Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej w Koreańskiej 
Republice Ludowo-Demokratycznej za okres od dnia 20 X I1961 do dnia 22 V 1962 r., Pyon­
gyang, 22 V 1962 r.
10 Ibid., Raport Polityczny Ambasady Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej w Koreańskiej 
Republice Ludowo-Demokratycznej za okres do dnia 22 V 1962 do dnia 5 XII 1962 r.
11AMSZ, Department II, 32/66, w. 1, Notatka dot. ograniczeń stosowanych przez władze
Ibidem
pobytu w Polsce koreańskiemu mężowi obywatelski polskiej, Warszawa, 10IX 1963 r;
12 Ibid., Raport polityczny Ambasady Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej w Koreańskiej 
Republice Ludowo-Demokratycznej za okres od dnia 5 grudzień 1962 r. do dnia 13 czerwca 
1963 r.,Pyongyang, 17 VI 1963.
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to the DPRK, students from Poland, similarly to those from other “revisionist” 
countries, had to deal with numerous problems. Right after arrival, they were 
obliged to participate in a two-month ideological training, and only after that could 
they see their families for a couple of days. Later, in spite of their education and 
ąualifications, students were sent to work in the countryside. Some of them were 
forced to do physical work, which was a kind of punishment. Furthermore, former 
students were under constant surveillance and authorities forbade them to contact 
the Polish Embassy as well as sending letters to Poland. Four of them broke the 
prohibition and asked a Polish specialist working in the DPRK to take their letters 
to Poland. They all wrote about the hard conditions of living in North Korea, about 
their strong attachment to Poland, and dreams to come back there13.
In 1963, North Korean ties with the Soviet camp became even worse. In 
December 1962, a North Korean delegationvisited the USSR and asked for military 
aid. Envoys did not achieve their goal, so after this, DPRK-USSR relations declined 
again and were at their lowest point in years 1963-1964. A theory circulated among 
diplomats working in Pyongyang that the Chinese had pushed Koreans to present 
wishes unacceptable for Soviets in order to weaken USSR-DPRK links, in favor of 
a China-North Korea alliance14.
Simultaneously, Polish-North Korean ties also worsened. In 1963, the Polish 
Embassy regularly informed Warsaw about negative tendencies in mutual contacts 
and compared it with past years. For Polish diplomats, one of the most important 
annual events was a celebration of the National Day of Poland’s Revival (22nd of 
July). Every year, the embassy together with North Koreans co-organized events 
commemorating that datę. Different than in previous years, the anniversary in 1963 
was celebrated in a very formal way. During meetings with employees of industrial 
complexes that had been constructed by Polish engineers and specialists, diplomats 
could not give a speech. North Korean authorities were afraid that Poles could have 
discussed controversial problems that would influence the people in unwanted ways.
What is morę, during a reception in the Polish Embassy, the North Korean 
deputy prime minister, during his toast speech, expressed a hope that North Korea 
and Poland would together fight against “imperialism” and “revisionism”. Guests 
from other countries were surprised and these words were received with meaningful 
silence. The First Secretary of the Embassy outlined that the atmosphere of the 
reception was cool. However, he added that according to diplomatic corps resided 
in Pyongyang, the climate of the whole commemoration was better than in cases 
of similar anniversaries celebrated by other diplomatic missions representing States 
subordinated to Moscow15.
l3Ibid., Notatka uzupełnienie notatki z 23 grudnia w sprawie b. studentów koreańskich w 
Polsce, Warszawa 2 1 1963 r.
lĄIbid., Notatka z rozmowy z Radcą Ambasady ZSRR tow. Pimionowem, Pyongyang, 1 III 
1963 r.; B. Szalontai, op. cit., p. 98.
15 Ibid., Notatka dot. obchodów 19 rocznicy Odrodzenia Polski w KRLD, Pyongyang, 25 
VH 1963 r.
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Regardless of limited contacts and distrust towards Poland, the embassy got 
the impression that to some extent North Korean authorities treated Poles better 
than representatives of other European countries dependent on the Soviet Union, 
with the exception of Romania which became a leading North Korean partner from 
the above-mentioned group of States. This feeling among Polish diplomats was a 
result of repeated Korean remarks that there had never been conflicts between both 
States and the expression of gratitude for constant support for main DPRK goals on 
an intemational stage. The behavior of North Korean officials rosę a ąuestion of the 
purpose of the described approach. The First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, Jan 
Witek, supposed that Koreans did not want to cut off all ties with leading European 
communist countries. Another explanation he considered said that they might have 
wanted to divide the pro-Soviet Bloc16.
D istrust Towards the NNSC
In the described time, the working and living conditions worsened for Polish 
members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) who, sińce 
summer 1953, were stationed in the northem part of the Demilitarized Zonę. 
Until summer 1956, the commission consisted of Polish, Czechoslovak, Swedish, 
and Swiss delegates who could monitor the situation in 10 ports of entry (five 
in DPRK and five in ROK, respectively), as well as in spots where violations of 
the armistice had been reported. The NNSC’s inspection teams did it in order to 
prevent reinforcement of the Peninsula. In the late spring of 1956, after withdrawal 
of the inspection teams, firstly from South Korea and soon from North Korea, the 
commission’s impact on the situation at the Peninsula was significantly reduced17. 
However, Polish delegates stayed in DPRK until early 1995.
After the 22ndCongress of the CPSU, Poles faced many difficulties. Their 
freedom of movement was eminently limited. They were told that walking further 
than 300 meters from the camp without the assistance of the guards were prohibited; 
Koreans explained that restrictions were necessary to save delegates from stepping 
on mines. Poles perceived this explanation as absurd because they moved only on 
beaten paths and roads. Moreover, sińce February 1962 members of the NNSC 
could go on a trip or hunting only in the Kaesong district, but no one told them 
where the district borders ended.
Another restriction concemed traveling to Pyongyang. If they visited the Capital, 
they were obliged to stay in a military hotel surrounded by guards. In previous
16 Ibid., Notatka charge d’affaires PRL w Phenianie J. Witka z wypowiedzi min. Pak Son- 
Czola na coctailu 17 bm. Z okazji 15 rocznicy nawiązania stosunków dyplomatycznych między
Ibidem
ologicznym, Pyongyang, 16 XII 1963 r.
17 Cho Sung-hun, Roles and Meaning o f the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission 
(NNSC), [in:] “Role of the NNSC shaping the security architecture at the Korean Peninsula 
after signing of the Armistice Agreement, Seoul 2013, pp. 5-11.
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years, members of the commission had had accommodation in a hotel dedicated to 
foreign guests. New limitations were supported by the ridiculous argument that in 
ordinary hotels they could meet South Korean spies18.
Poles realized that when they were outside their homes, Korean servants were 
searching their rooms and all of their belongings. On other occasions, servants 
eavesdropped on their conversations and reported about them to Korean military 
personnel. Another sign of a new approach towards Poles was the DPRK authorities’ 
efforts to limit contacts between Polish delegates and ordinary Koreans. Poles 
reported about an incident in Kaesong, when at the stadium, a group of orphans 
who had spent several years in Poland wanted to greet the Polish officers, but they 
all were forcibly removed by the guards in front of thousands of viewers. Another 
time, when a youngster who had studied in Poland wanted to talk at the Street 
of Pyongyang with a Polish officer, a Korean guard brutally pushed the Pole and 
blocked their conversation.
The Korean security apparatus could not prevent all contact with ordinary 
Koreans so the police punished people who, in its opinion, were too close with 
Poles. For instance, a woman working at the post oflfice was dismissed and forced 
to do physical work because she had received chocolate from Polish members of 
the NNSC. Another example may be a case of two Korean women that spoke with 
a Polish attache at the Street of the Capital city, and after that was put under house 
arrest19.
Poles were displeased by North Korean moves, especially when they did not 
respect the ranks of Polish officers. One situation was especially offensive. An 
incident took place when the chief of the Polish delegation, Gen. Mróz, during a 
walk with his wife, collected flowers and put them into his general’s hat. They were 
observed from one kilometer away by Korean guards who, after several minutes, 
ran close to the couple and without asking for permission, one of them looked inside 
the general’s hat. It was a telling example of disrespect towards high-rank officer20.
In spite of distrust and putting Polish members of the NNSC under surveillance, 
DPRK authorities expected close cooperation from the Polish side. Koreans 
especially paid attention to their service when in the early 1960s, Poles were invited 
to visit Seoul. DPRK officials wanted Polish officers to gather as much information 
as possible and share it with Koreans. In late 1962, they specified that they were 
interested not only in the location of South Korean military units, but also in the 
personal data of people who guided Poles and the photographs taken during such 
trips. Poles promised to meet those expectations21.
18 Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance (AIPN), 01227/109, Raport dot. 
naszychstosunkówzesztabemkoreańskim, Panmunjom, 10I I 1962, pp. 29-31 (pdf).
19 Ibid., Raport. Sytuacja pracowników Misji w Korei, Warszawa, I I 1962, pp. 26-28.
20 Ibid., 01227/109, Raport dot. stosunku Sztabu Koreańskiego do Misji Polskiej, Panmun­
jom, 21 V 1962, p. 32.
21AMSZ, Department II, 10/66, w. 3, Notatka z rozmowy z Ministrem Spraw Zagranicz­
nych Pak SonCzholem dnia 18 listopada br., Pyongyang, X II1962 r.
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The signals of North Korean intention to improve relations with the Soviet 
Union and its satellites, came right after the overthrowing of Nikita Khrushchev 
on October 14, 1964. The decision about his dismissal was announced on covers 
of North Korean press titles, and in Pyongyang, information came several times 
through public loudspeakers. Kim II Sung sent a telegram to congratulate Leonid 
Brezhnev on becoming the new First Secretary of the CPSU, and expressed hope 
that friendship and solidarity between both States and nations would be strengthened. 
The last day of October 1964, he received the Soviet Ambassador and in a friendly 
conversation stressed that the DPRK wished to improve bilateral relations and 
asked if  North Korea could send a delegation to participate in the celebration of 
the anniversary of the October Revolution in the Soviet Capital. A positive answer 
came lirom Moscow the same day22.
Almost one year after these events, the DPRK ambassador in Poland admitted 
that Khrushchev and his politics was the biggest obstacle to advance relations with 
the Eastem Bloc. According to DPRK diplomat, a major mistake of former First 
Secretary of the CPSU, was that he interfered in intemal affairs of communist parties 
in other countries and a lack of will to fight against the “American imperialism”23.
From the North Korean point of view, the fali of Khmshchev took place right 
on time. Only a few months before it happened, in late August 1964, the DPRK 
openly attacked the CPSU for “revisionism” and blamed its 20th Congress for 
causing a conflict inside the communist camp. Ten days later, the North Korean 
press publicly accused the Soviet Union of forcing the DPRK to sell to the USSR 
its minerals for prices lower than world prices. It was a new situation because till 
that time, North Koreans criticized “revisionism” without pointing out the Soviet 
Union as a source of division inside the communist bloc.
What is morę, during the previous year, no political delegation from the Soviet 
Bloc visited North Korea and exchange between delegations in the field of culture 
was at a level of 10% of what it used to be compared with years before the 22nd 
Congress of the CPSU. The Polish Embassy in Pyongyang concluded that DPRK 
relations with the USSR and its satellites reached the lowest point in history and that 
further deterioration could harm North Korean political and economic interests24.
Poles were assured about Korean will to develop mutual relations right after 
the Khrushchev collapse. Ambassador WładysławNapieraj was received by Kim II 
Sung on October 16, 1964, and their conversation lasted over one hour. The North 
Korean leader expressed an opinion that the Polish-DPRK relations were good and
Turning Point
22 AMSZ, Department II, 26/67, w. 2, Notatka o nowych zjawiskach w KRLD po zmia­
nach personalnych w ZSRR, Pyongyang, 30 X 1964 r.
23
24 AMSZ, Department II, 26/67, w. 2, Raport polityczny Ambasady PRL w Phenianie za 
okres od 1 stycznia 1964 r. do 15 września 1964 r. Pyongyang, 1 X 1964 r.
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expressed gratitude for Polish help during the reconstruction of the country afiter the 
Korean War. He also said that both States had never criticized each other and that 
the DPRK wished to improve relations25. It could have been only a ritual exchange 
of courtesies, but following events proved that Kim II Sung communicated a real
intention.
In November 1964, DPRK oflicials presented to the Polish Ambassador an 
idea of founding a Polish-North Korean shipping company. Moreover, in the 
following months, cultural cooperation was intensified little by little, and in the 
field of economy both States expected that by 1966, volume of trade exchange 
would grow 27%26.
In spite of announced intentions to develop mutual relations, visible sińce 
late 1964, in February 1965 Korean press published a controversial article which 
caused Polish authorities to regard the DPRK’s official declaration with suspicion. 
The piece ąuoted several sentences from British and Belgian press, in which the 
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, 
WładysławGomułka, was called a “revisionist” and “mercenary of capitalists”. 
Additionally, the Rapacki Plan was presented as an initiative in favor of Americans 
and a continuation of cooperation with the West, initiated by Khrushchev27.
However, the following months proved that North Korean authorities really 
wanted to intensify contacts with the Soviet Union and its satellites, including 
Poland. One of the major factors pushing them in that direction was an escalation 
of conflict in Vietnam in 1965. In new political realities, good relations with old 
partners seemed to be morę important than ideological differences. Moreover, 
DPRK authorities wanted to rebuild ties with the Soviet Union because the USSR 
signed a defense treaty with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and provided 
financial and military aid to it. On the contrary, the closest North Korean ally in 
the early 1960s, Mao Zedong, decided that his troops would not participate in a 
Vietnam war if the United States did not enter a Chinese territory. Mao did not 
want to copy a scenario from the Korean War, because he was preparing a new 
revolution, inaugurated in 1966, the Cultural Revolution. In that regard, it appeared 
that in case of war on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union potentially could 
ofifer bigger help than China. Furthermore, the ąuality of military eąuipment which 
the Soviets provided to their allies was better than those received in the early 1960s 
by Koreans from the PRC. North Korean efforts resulted in receiving a free military 
aid from the USSR in 196528. It is worth mentioning, that a value of this aid was
25 Ibid., Notatka z wizyty protokolarnej u premiera KRL-D Kim Ir Sena w dniu 16 X 1964 
r., Pyongyang, 17 X 1964 r.
26 AMSZ, Department II, 48/68, w. 5, Raport Polityczny Ambasady PRL w Phenianie za 





50% morę than what North Korea asked from Khrushchev in 196229. It was a visible 
sign that the Soviets really wanted to have North Koreans on their side in a time of 
deepening conflict with the PRC.
In 1965, another important event took place that was perceived by North 
Korean elites as potentially dangerous. In June of that year, South Korea and Japan 
established diplomatic ties and DPRK officials were affaid that another step could 
be a foundation of the anti-communist alliance in the Far East. From the DPRK 
authorities’ point of view, together with the Vietnam war and economic reforms 
implemented in South Korea by Gen. Park Chung-hee, normalization of relations 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea created an unstable intemational 
environment. That is why North Korea conseąuently revised its previous politics 
towards the USSR, Poland, and other Soviet satellites. In this regard, the year 1965 
can be seen as the first year sińce 1961 when relations between Poland and North 
Korea were rather good than fuli of distrust and distance. Conseąuently, it definitely 
ended the worst period in bilateral contacts sińce its establishment in 1948 and 
during the whole Cold War.
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